We examine whether a taxpayer’s decision to choose a taxpayer-favorable characterization of income is associated with contextual and individual dimensions of that decision. Using a 2 × 2 factorial experimental design, we manipulate the prevailing social norm on whether there is a general belief that a specific form of income should be characterized as a capital gain or as ordinary income, and the group affiliation on whether the individual is making a tax characterization decision as a sole proprietor or as (...) a member of a group practice. Moreover, we measure participants’ fairness perception of characterizing the income as capital gains versus ordinary. We study the decisions of 180 graduate business and accounting students from two US business schools to explore these dimensions using a tax-ambiguous income situation. Results indicate that both contextual and individual dimensions impact taxpayer decisions. Specifically, the social norm and fairness perception of characterizing income as capital gains affects the likelihood of choosing such a characterization. Being a sole proprietor or a member of a group practice does not have any significant main effect. However, relative to all other conditions, taxpayers are most likely to characterize income as capital gains when both the social norms are for capital gains characterization and when the taxpayer is a member of a group practice. Results remain largely robust to a variety of alternative explanations. We conclude the paper with a discussion of our findings and their implications for tax policy, enforcement, and research. (shrink)

The say-on-pay regulation in the Dodd-Frank Act requires publicly-traded U.S. firms to hold a nonbinding, advisory shareholder vote on executive compensation. Advocates claim that SOP voting gives shareholders a mechanism to hold managers and boards more accountable. Critics contend that SOP votes may simplistically reflect shareholders’ reactions to the overall value of CEO compensation or the firm’s net income. However, based on prior research, we contend that market participants’ SOP votes are likely to consider current income attributes. For example, the (...) market punishes firms that do not meet or beat benchmarks such as analyst earnings expectations, and that shareholders scrutinize the quality of the income sources of firms that consistently meet/beat analyst expectations. We thus expect that more shareholders will provide ‘agree’ SOP votes for a firm that consistently meets/beats analyst forecasts and does so when net income does not include nonrecurring gains. Further, we consider whether perceptions about the fairness of CEO compensation play a mediating role in the relationship between the interaction of these two current income attributes and SOP votes. Results from an experiment using evening MBA students as participants indicates that the two current income attributes significantly interact with respect to the percentage of agree SOP votes, and that compensation fairness perceptions fully mediate this relationship. Further, the mediating effect of compensation fairness perceptions is robust to including CEO-level and other determinants found in prior research. We conclude with a discussion of our findings and their implications for public policy and research. (shrink)

The growth in demand for corporate social responsibility information raises the question of how various CSR disclosure items are used by investors, an important stakeholder group driven by instrumental, moral, and relational motives. Prior research examines the instrumental motive to maximize individual shareholder wealth and the moral motive to actualize personal stewardship interests. We contribute to the literature by examining investors’ relational motive to realize positive stakeholder relationships within and between organizations and communities. The relational motive arises when investors look (...) at a company’s treatment of other stakeholder groups as a heuristic to form a perception of how fairly they will also be treated by that company in the future, and thus invest in the company they perceive as fair. Fair treatment in the future matters to the investor who purchases stock from the company or via the capital markets in exchange for becoming a shareholder and thus a residual claimant of the company. As such, the investor expects future cash flows from holding and/or reselling the stock and expects to be treated fairly by the company in the future. We propose that investors, use as a fairness heuristic, CSR disclosure items—CSR investment level or CSR assurance—that represent the company’s commitment to its stakeholders, and that the resulting fairness perception affects the extent to which the CSR disclosure items influence their investment decision. Using responses from 113 investors in an online experiment, we find that fairness perceptions are higher when CSR investment is above the industry average, and that fairness perceptions partially mediate the impact of the CSR investment level on investment amount allocations. We do not find that the presence of CSR assurance is used by investors as a fairness heuristic. Our results are robust to controlling for preferences for financial performance and hence investors’ instrumental motive, and to controlling for individual environmental attitudes, and hence investors’ moral motive. Implications for future research and public policy are discussed. (shrink)

We examine whether a taxpayer’s decision to choose a taxpayer-favorable (vs. a taxpayer-unfavorable) characterization of income is associated with contextual and individual dimensions of that decision. Using a 2 × 2 factorial experimental design, we manipulate the prevailing social norm on whether there is a general belief that a specific form of income should be characterized as a capital gain (taxed at a lower tax rate and hence taxpayer favorable) or as ordinary income (taxed at a higher tax rate and (...) hence taxpayer unfavorable), and the group affiliation on whether the individual is making a tax characterization decision as a sole proprietor or as a member of a group practice. Moreover, we measure participants’ fairness perception of characterizing the income as capital gains versus ordinary. We study the decisions of 180 graduate business and accounting students from two US business schools to explore these dimensions using a tax-ambiguous income situation. Results indicate that both contextual and individual dimensions impact taxpayer decisions. Specifically, the social norm and fairness perception of characterizing income as capital gains affects the likelihood of choosing such a characterization. Being a sole proprietor or a member of a group practice does not have any significant main effect. However, relative to all other conditions, taxpayers are most likely to characterize income as capital gains when both the social norms are for capital gains characterization and when the taxpayer is a member of a group practice. Results remain largely robust to a variety of alternative explanations. We conclude the paper with a discussion of our findings and their implications for tax policy, enforcement, and research. (shrink)

v. 1. Commentaria in Aristotelem Armeniaca-Davidis Opera.

v. 1. Commentaria in Aristotelem Armeniaca-Davidis Opera.

Both Michel Foucault and Barbara Cassin address Aristotle’s thought and the 5th century BCE sources attributed to the rhetorician Gorgias in order to reconstruct the history of the strategic exclusion of the Sophistics from the Western philosophical tradition. They retrace the scene of the rhetoric agon that Aristotle engaged with Gorgias. Both theorists’ arguments illuminate that the sophist has formulated an original account of political theatricality by talking about the scenes of the logos.

Quelle est la place du scepticisme dans l'œuvre d'un philosophe des Lumières comme Denis Diderot? Cet ouvrage vise à mettre en évidence les caractéristiques de la réception des instances sceptiques dans les œuvres de Diderot. L'analyse prend en considération l'ensemble du corpus diderotien, y compris sa contribution à l'Encyclopédie. L'objectif est aussi de montrer que la méthode sceptique de Diderot, qui consiste en l'usage de certaines argumentations, mais aussi en un ensemble de choix stylistiques, permet de mieux interpréter certaines spécificités (...) de sa pensée philosophique et de son matérialisme. Une meilleure compréhension du rôle du scepticisme dans la pensée de Diderot vise à apporter une contribution aux études sur ce qu'on définit comme le scepticisme des Lumières, en montrant qu'il serait plus exact de parler de scepticismes au pluriel, en raison des différences qui subsistent parmi les philosophes. Pour cette raison, ce livre propose des confrontations entre Diderot et ses sources sceptiques, mais aussi avec d'autres philosophes de son époque comme Montesquieu, Voltaire, D'Alembert et Hume"--Page 4 of cover. (shrink)

We consider embeddings of structures which preserve spectra: if g: M → S with S computable, then M should have the same Turing degree spectrum (as a structure) that g(M) has (as a relation on S). We show that the computable dense linear order L is universal for all countable linear orders under this notion of embedding, and we establish a similar result for the computable random graph G. Such structures are said to be spectrally universal. We use our results (...) to answer a question of Goncharov, and also to characterize the possible spectra of structures as precisely the spectra of unary relations on G. Finally, we consider the extent to which all spectra of unary relations on the structure L may be realized by such embeddings, offering partial results and building the first known example of a structure whose spectrum contains precisely those degrees c with c′ ≥T 0″. (shrink)

L’articolo qui riproposto e apparso originariamente nel 1988 anticipa alcune questioni fondamentali trattate nel presente numero, in riferimento alla collaborazione tra il video-artista Paolo Rosa e il suo gruppo Studio Azzurro e il regista teatrale Giorgio Barberio Corsetti. L’articolo sottolinea come l’incontro tra video-arte e teatro, tra arti tecnologiche e arti performative, rinnovi uno dei tratti caratteristici della pratica artistica moderna, dalla letteratura alle arti visive e performative: lo statuto del soggetto, in cui è in gioco l’interazione tra l’interno e (...) l’esterno della vita, della coscienza e dell’esperienza individuale. La collaborazione di Rosa e Studio Azzurro con Barberio Corsetti si collega così alla tradizione artistica moderna, sottolineata in modo particolare dall’opera letteraria di Rainer Maria Rilke. (shrink)

Les débats sur la technique voient s'affronter souvent des positions tranchées entre technophiles et technophobes. On avancerait sans doute en déplaçant la question de la valeur et des dangers des artefacts techniques vers une réflexion philosophique plus profonde sur la technicisation de la vie et du monde, qui mérite généalogie et archéologie. Cet ouvrage, qui réunit plusieurs philosophes réputés de la question, veut à cet égard convoquer au débat les pensées de Martin Heidegger et de Michel Foucault qui ont permis (...) à travers leurs usages de la terminologie du Gestell et du dispositif de renouveler la question de la technique. Même si M. Foucault a été marqué par les analyses heideggériennes, il s'agit d'aller bien au-delà de la question des influences. Les langues d'appartenance de ces termes, leurs traductions deviennent aussi l'occasion d'explorer à nouveaux frais la complexité de la question. (shrink)

L’obiettivo che questo lavoro si propone è quello di rintracciare nella prosa appassionante e appassionata di Michele Federico Sciacca tracce che rimandano alla speculazione filosofica di Bernardo di Chiaravalle. Divisi nel tempo, ma compartecipi di un modo comune di intendere la categoria mistica, i due filosofi appaiono uniti nella condivisione di una stessa sensibilità. È una filiazione che accoglie più interrogativi che certezze, primo tra tutti, il perché Sciacca non citi mai direttamente Bernardo, cosa che invece ripetutamente fa con Agostino, (...) Tommaso, Bonaventura, e altre colonne portanti del pensiero. Sono molte in tal senso le ipotesi che vengono prese in considerazione, tra queste l’idea che per il filosofo di Giarre, Bernardo fosse non una semplice fonte, ma una lente attraverso la quale guardare meglio e più lontano. Un legame taciuto dunque, tenuto a riparo dalla vista dei più, quello che Sciacca ha lasciato crescere tra le pieghe dei suoi scritti. I due filosofi sfidano il tempo e si trovano, o ri-trovano dentro una sincronicità filosofica che li vede messaggeri dagli stessi valori. In questo forse “immaginario” dialogo tra un pensatore che ha saputo sporgere lo sguardo oltre il suo secolo, e uno che non ha mai perso occasione per riflettere e riflettersi attraverso il passato, è possibile ritrovare e godere della tensione emotiva dell’essere umano che pretende di ricongiungersi con l’Assoluto. The aim of this paper is to find in Michele Federico Sciacca’s fascinating and passionate prose traces that refer to Bernard of Clairvaux philosophical speculation. Distant in time, but sharing a common way of understanding the mystical category, the two philosophers appear united in having the same sensitivity. It is a filiation that welcomes more questions than certainties. First of all, why Sciacca never quotes Bernard directly, something that instead he repeatedly does with Augustine, Thomas, Bonaventure, and many others. In this sense, many hypotheses are taken into consideration, including the idea that for the philosopher of Giarre, Bernard was not just a source, but a lens through which to look better and further awy. A silent relationship, therefore, kept away from the sight of most, that which Sciacca has allowed to grow between the folds of his writings. The two philosophers defy time and find themselves, or refind within a philosophical synchronicity that sees them as messengers of the same values. In this perhaps “imaginary” dialogue between a thinker who has been able to look beyond his century, and one who has never missed an opportunity to reflect and reflect through the past, we can find and enjoy the emotional tension of the human being who claims to reconnect with the Absolute. (shrink)

Cet article questionne la situation de la littérature au temps de la mondialisation. Le désir du sinologue François Jullien de découvrir s’il y a encore la possibilité d’établir un dialogue entre les cultures — pas en termes d’identité, mais d’écart et de fécondité culturelle — a suscité ma curiosité. Comment la littérature et l’imaginaire des lecteurs sont-ils en train de se modifier? Notre terrain d’observation privilégié sera celui de ce que nous appellerons l’écriture migrante, lorsque les écrivains immigrés utilisent la (...) langue du pays d’accueil pour écrire leurs histoires. Ce sujet, à son tour, conduit aux questions du canon littéraire, de l’intertextualité et de l’interprétation comme base lexicale pour la réécriture d’un nouveau réseau de mots-clés de la littérature, à l’époque de la postmodernité. The main aspect of this article concerns the situation of literature in the time of globalization. We have organized this work on the base of François Jullien’s theory about the possibility to establish a cultural dialogue, not in terms of identity, but in terms of difference and cultural fecundity. How literature and the reader’s imaginary are changing? In order to extend this research we have also considered the problem of the migrant writing: a kind of writing realized by migrant writers, who use the language of the host country in their stories. An issue that puts in evidence other problems, such as the discussion about literary canon, the subjects of interpretation and intertextuality in terms of innovative keywords to reflect on the postmodern literature. (shrink)

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:“Though This Be Madness, Yet There Is Method in ’T”A Positive Account of MadnessValentina Cardella, PhD (bio)What does it mean to be mad? How can we define mental disorder? The question is still widely discussed among psychiatrists and philosophers, and what exactly distinguishes sanity and insanity remains unclear. Despite this lack of clarity, the common conceptualization of madness is that mental disorders are impairments in rationality: people with mental (...) disorders are generally believed to have impairments in reasoning and logic (Bermúdez, 2001; Edwards, 1981; Harvey, Watkins, Mansell, & Shafran, 2004).Yet, the result of this conception is that we fail to understand madness. We do not understand how, for example, schizophrenic patients can be more logical than healthy people in some reasoning tasks (Mellet et al., 2006; Owen, Cutting, & David, 2007), or delusional patients can be perfectly rational in defending their ideas (Cardella, 2020), or depressive people can be more realistic than non-clinical subjects (Moore & Fresco, 2012). In contrast, if we consider rationality as the core feature of sanity, we fail to understand sanity, too, because normal people exhibit many kinds of biases and heuristics, and thus irrationality is widespread in the general population (Bortolotti, 2020; Johnson-Laird, 2006; Evans, 2002; Kahneman, Tversky, & Slovic, 1982).In his paper, Garson focuses on Late Modern theorists of madness (Locke, Kant, Wigan, and Heinroth) to reframe the problem and provide a positive account of mental disorder. These authors contrast madness to idiocy, rather than sanity, and therefore their conception of madness is very different: “while idiocy is marked by the diminished, or even abolished, functioning of the reasoning power, madness is marked by its perverse functioning. The mad person “has” reason, but deploys it in a perverse, improper, or unseemly manner” (Garson, 2023, p. 286).In his reading of Late Modern authors, Garson provides a new ontology of mental disorder, that goes beyond an absence of reason, and has also political and social implications. Furthermore, he reminds us that every scientific discipline has its philosophical assumptions. In defining madness, [End Page 305] we cannot help but choose a contrasting class, and each choice will have very different consequences. Even if psychiatry is a medical discipline, which aims to endorse a neutral view of mental disorder, it is impossible for it to be unbiased and impartial. All the more so, for it has to deal with human suffering and fragility.But, in this article, there is one crucial question that remains unanswered. In his analysis of Late Modern theorization of madness, Garson comes to the conclusion that madness is marked by a perverse deployment of reason. Yet, who decides when reason is deployed in a perverse manner? While the lack of rationality is something that we can detect easily enough, the task of defining precisely what is an ‘improper’ or ‘perverse’ use of reason is much harder. In other words, it seems to me that, in replacing the ‘lack of rationality’ paradigm with ‘the perverse rationality paradigm,’ the question of what is madness still remains open, and, most important, some normative aspects remain necessary. To recognize when rationality is improperly used, we have to adopt an evaluative stance, which defines what a proper use of reason would be.Valentina [email protected] University of MessinaValentina Cardella Valentina Cardella is Associate Professor of Philosophy of Language at the University of Messina, Italy. Her research interests encompass cognitive sciences, philosophy of language, and psychopathology.The author reports no conflicts of interest.Commentary submitted on June 13, 2023Accepted on June 13, 2023ReferencesBermúdez, J. L. (2001). Normativity and rationality in delusional psychiatric disorders. Mind and Language 16, 457–93. Google ScholarBortolotti, L. (2020). The epistemic innocence of irrational beliefs. Oxford: Oxford University Press. Google ScholarCardella, V. (2020). Rationality in mental disorders: too little or too much? European Journal of Analytic Philosophy 16 (2), 13–36. Google ScholarEdwards, R. B. (1997). Mental health as rational autonomy. In Edwards, R. B. (ed.), Ethics of psychiatry: Insanity, rational autonomy, and mental health care. New York: Prometheus Books. Google ScholarEvans, J. (2002). Logic and human reasoning: an assessment of the deduction paradigm. Psychological Bulletin 128... (shrink)

R. Shore proved that every recursively enumerable set can be split into two nowhere simple sets. Splitting theorems play an important role in recursion theory since they provide information about the lattice ϵ of all r. e. sets. Nowhere simple sets were further studied by D. Miller and J. Remmel, and we generalize some of their results. We characterize r. e. sets which can be split into two effectively nowhere simple sets, and r. e. sets which can be split into (...) two r. e. non-nowhere simple sets. We show that every r. e. set is either the disjoint union of two effectively nowhere simple sets or two noneffectively nowhere simple sets. We characterize r. e. sets whose every nontrivial splitting is into nowhere simple sets, and r. e. sets whose every nontrivial splitting is into effectively nowhere simple sets. R. Shore proved that for every effectively nowhere simple set A, the lattice L* is effectively isomorphic to ϵ*, and that there is a nowhere simple set A such that L* is not effectively isomorphic to ϵ*. We prove that every nonzero r. e. Turing degree contains a noneffectively nowhere simple set A with the lattice L* effectively isomorphic to ϵ*. (shrink)

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:“Though This Be Madness, Yet There Is Method in ’T”A Positive Account of MadnessValentina Cardella, PhD (bio)What does it mean to be mad? How can we define mental disorder? The question is still widely discussed among psychiatrists and philosophers, and what exactly distinguishes sanity and insanity remains unclear. Despite this lack of clarity, the common conceptualization of madness is that mental disorders are impairments in rationality: people with mental (...) disorders are generally believed to have impairments in reasoning and logic (Bermúdez, 2001; Edwards, 1981; Harvey, Watkins, Mansell, & Shafran, 2004).Yet, the result of this conception is that we fail to understand madness. We do not understand how, for example, schizophrenic patients can be more logical than healthy people in some reasoning tasks (Mellet et al., 2006; Owen, Cutting, & David, 2007), or delusional patients can be perfectly rational in defending their ideas (Cardella, 2020), or depressive people can be more realistic than non-clinical subjects (Moore & Fresco, 2012). In contrast, if we consider rationality as the core feature of sanity, we fail to understand sanity, too, because normal people exhibit many kinds of biases and heuristics, and thus irrationality is widespread in the general population (Bortolotti, 2020; Johnson-Laird, 2006; Evans, 2002; Kahneman, Tversky, & Slovic, 1982).In his paper, Garson focuses on Late Modern theorists of madness (Locke, Kant, Wigan, and Heinroth) to reframe the problem and provide a positive account of mental disorder. These authors contrast madness to idiocy, rather than sanity, and therefore their conception of madness is very different: “while idiocy is marked by the diminished, or even abolished, functioning of the reasoning power, madness is marked by its perverse functioning. The mad person “has” reason, but deploys it in a perverse, improper, or unseemly manner” (Garson, 2023, p. 286).In his reading of Late Modern authors, Garson provides a new ontology of mental disorder, that goes beyond an absence of reason, and has also political and social implications. Furthermore, he reminds us that every scientific discipline has its philosophical assumptions. In defining madness, [End Page 305] we cannot help but choose a contrasting class, and each choice will have very different consequences. Even if psychiatry is a medical discipline, which aims to endorse a neutral view of mental disorder, it is impossible for it to be unbiased and impartial. All the more so, for it has to deal with human suffering and fragility.But, in this article, there is one crucial question that remains unanswered. In his analysis of Late Modern theorization of madness, Garson comes to the conclusion that madness is marked by a perverse deployment of reason. Yet, who decides when reason is deployed in a perverse manner? While the lack of rationality is something that we can detect easily enough, the task of defining precisely what is an ‘improper’ or ‘perverse’ use of reason is much harder. In other words, it seems to me that, in replacing the ‘lack of rationality’ paradigm with ‘the perverse rationality paradigm,’ the question of what is madness still remains open, and, most important, some normative aspects remain necessary. To recognize when rationality is improperly used, we have to adopt an evaluative stance, which defines what a proper use of reason would be.Valentina [email protected] University of MessinaValentina Cardella Valentina Cardella is Associate Professor of Philosophy of Language at the University of Messina, Italy. Her research interests encompass cognitive sciences, philosophy of language, and psychopathology.The author reports no conflicts of interest.Commentary submitted on June 13, 2023Accepted on June 13, 2023ReferencesBermúdez, J. L. (2001). Normativity and rationality in delusional psychiatric disorders. Mind and Language 16, 457–93. Google ScholarBortolotti, L. (2020). The epistemic innocence of irrational beliefs. Oxford: Oxford University Press. Google ScholarCardella, V. (2020). Rationality in mental disorders: too little or too much? European Journal of Analytic Philosophy 16 (2), 13–36. Google ScholarEdwards, R. B. (1997). Mental health as rational autonomy. In Edwards, R. B. (ed.), Ethics of psychiatry: Insanity, rational autonomy, and mental health care. New York: Prometheus Books. Google ScholarEvans, J. (2002). Logic and human reasoning: an assessment of the deduction paradigm. Psychological Bulletin 128... (shrink)

Le problème du temps tourmente et nourrit la philosophie depuis sa naissance. Dans ce cadre, une lecture métaphysique des textes de S. Leśniewski permet de développer un point de vue original sur certaines propriétés fondamentales du temps logique. En particulier, après une analyse minutieuse des œuvres philosophiques de jeunesse, et notamment de l’article « La vérité est-elle éternelle ou éternelle et sempiternelle? », nous montrons que le temps logique est, chez Leśniewski, inévitablement double : les propositions, dont la vérité doit (...) pouvoir être _éternelle_, sont des entités qui se développent dans un espace et dans un temps déterminés. De même, cette double temporalité apparaît dans l’Ontologie, un calcul logique des noms dont l’axiomatique est établie à partir du foncteur ε, connecteur logique à la fois inscrit dans un espace et dans un temps et néanmoins sans ancrage temporel. Ainsi, plusie... (shrink)

Cohesive powersof computable structures are effective analogs of ultrapowers, where cohesive sets play the role of ultrafilters. Let$\omega $,$\zeta $, and$\eta $denote the respective order-types of the natural numbers, the integers, and the rationals when thought of as linear orders. We investigate the cohesive powers of computable linear orders, with special emphasis on computable copies of$\omega $. If$\mathcal {L}$is a computable copy of$\omega $that is computably isomorphic to the usual presentation of$\omega $, then every cohesive power of$\mathcal {L}$has order-type$\omega + (...) \zeta \eta $. However, there are computable copies of$\omega $, necessarily not computably isomorphic to the usual presentation, having cohesive powers not elementarily equivalent to$\omega + \zeta \eta $. For example, we show that there is a computable copy of$\omega $with a cohesive power of order-type$\omega + \eta $. Our most general result is that if$X \subseteq \mathbb {N} \setminus \{0\}$is a Boolean combination of$\Sigma _2$sets, thought of as a set of finite order-types, then there is a computable copy of$\omega $with a cohesive power of order-type$\omega + \boldsymbol {\sigma }(X \cup \{\omega + \zeta \eta + \omega ^*\})$, where$\boldsymbol {\sigma }(X \cup \{\omega + \zeta \eta + \omega ^*\})$denotes the shuffle of the order-types inXand the order-type$\omega + \zeta \eta + \omega ^*$. Furthermore, ifXis finite and non-empty, then there is a computable copy of$\omega $with a cohesive power of order-type$\omega + \boldsymbol {\sigma }(X)$. (shrink)

_Abstract_: In philosophy and cognitive science, the tension between cognitivism and the 4E-Cognition approach is both deep and polarizing. A lack of serious engagement with the theoretical and empirical work generated by the opposing framework seems problematic on both sides. In this paper, we closely discuss data on early socio-cognitive development produced by an influential nativist current of thought in the cognitivist paradigm. We consider these data from the point of view of a 4E-Cognition perspective called “the pairing hypothesis”, which (...) originates in phenomenological philosophy. We show that a close examination of these cognitivist-nativist data strengthens the phenomenological 4E-Cognition perspective by significantly expanding the range of findings it can account for. By addressing the debate between rich and lean explanations in early social cognition, we corroborate the idea that careful interaction between cognitivism and the 4E-Cognition approach can lead to progress in cognitive science. _Keywords_: Development of Social Cognition; Cognitivist Nativism; Direct Social Perception; Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences; Action Production and Perception _Spiegazioni ricche o parsimoniose? Un’alternativa fenomenologica per lo sviluppo della prima cognizione sociale_ _Riassunto_: Un’accesa e radicale tensione nelle scienze cognitive è quella tra il cognitivismo e il cosiddetto approccio delle quattro E (_Embodied, Enactive, Embedded_ e _Extended_). La mancanza di una riflessione aperta e sostanziale sul lavoro teorico ed empirico proposto dall’approccio opposto appare problematica da entrambe le parti. Il presente contributo analizza a fondo le evidenze empiriche presentate da una delle maggiori correnti innatiste del paradigma cognitivista nello studio dello sviluppo socio-cognitivo. Queste evidenze sperimentali vengono esaminate dal punto di vista della “ipotesi dell’appaiamento”, ipotesi inserita nel quadro della prospettiva teorica 4E e che proviene dalla filosofia fenomenologica. Il presente contributo mostra come una considerazione approfondita dei dati generati dal cognitivismo innatista può rafforzare il potere esplicativo della prospettiva fenomenologica 4E, ampliandone in misura significativa la gamma di evidenze scientifiche che essa può contribuire a spiegare. Affrontando il dibattito sullo sviluppo della prima cognizione sociale tra spiegazioni ricche e parsimoniose, viene corroborata l’idea che un’attenta interazione tra cognitivismo e approccio 4E può essere un modo per far progredire le scienze cognitive. _Parole chiave_: Sviluppo della cognizione sociale; Innatismo cognitivo; Percezione sociale diretta; Fenomenologia e scienze cognitive; Produzione e percezione di azioni. (shrink)

In the multi-agent setting, it is relevant to model group dynamics of agents, and logic has proved a good tool to do so. We propose an epistemic logic, L-DINF-E, that allows one to formalize what are the beliefs formed by a group of agents, where several groups exist and agents can pass from a group to another one. We introduce a new modality which allows an agent to reason about the beliefs of other agents. This allows us to model aspects (...) of the “Theory of Mind”, understood as the set of social-cognitive skills involving the ability to attribute and reason about mental states, desires, beliefs, and knowledge of agents. In this paper, we present the logic L-DINF-E and illustrate how it can be used to solve “false-belief tasks”, i.e., tests in which an agent should understand that some other agent may develop, under some circumstances, false beliefs. (shrink)

Au cours de la guerre froide, les organisations internationales, notamment celles du système de l’ONU, sont des tribunes instrumentalisées par les deux superpuissances pour se mettre en valeur. C’est le cas de l’UNESCO. Le discours de la cosmonaute soviétique Valentina Terechkova en 1966 est la première prise de parole d’une femme soviétique dans cette enceinte. Terechkova, qui a été la première femme au monde à effectuer, en 1963, un vol dans l’espace, utilise la tribune de l’UNESCO pour introduire des (...) enjeux de genre dans le cadre des relations internationales marquées par le contexte de guerre froide. Au-delà des rapports de force entre États marqués par la bipolarisation du monde, elle tente d’exprimer des arguments à prétention universaliste en faveur des droits des femmes et du développement, tout en produisant un discours à rhétorique typiquement soviétique. (shrink)

This is a comprehensive analysis of the idea of libertas and its conflicting uses in the political struggles of the late Roman Republic. By reconstructing Roman political thinking about liberty against the background of Classical and Hellenistic thought, it excavates two distinct intellectual traditions on the means allowing for the preservation and the loss of libertas. Considering the interplay of these traditions in the political debates of the first century BC, Dr Arena offers a significant reinterpretation of the political struggles (...) of the time as well as a radical reappraisal of the role played by the idea of liberty in the practice of politics. She argues that, as a result of its uses in rhetorical debates, libertas underwent a form of conceptual change at the end of the Republic and came to legitimise a new course of politics, which led progressively to the transformation of the whole political system. (shrink)

Ontologies represent the standard way to model the knowledge about specific domains. This holds also for the legal domain where several ontologies have been put forward to model specific kinds of legal knowledge. Both for standard users and for law scholars, it is often difficult to have an overall view on the existing alternatives, their main features and their interlinking with the other ontologies. To answer this need, in this paper, we address an analysis of the state-of-the-art in legal ontologies (...) and we characterise them along with some distinctive features. This paper aims to guide generic users and law experts in selecting the legal ontology that better fits their needs and in understanding its specificity so that proper extensions to the selected model could be investigated. (shrink)

Ontologies represent the standard way to model the knowledge about specific domains. This holds also for the legal domain where several ontologies have been put forward to model specific kinds of legal knowledge. Both for standard users and for law scholars, it is often difficult to have an overall view on the existing alternatives, their main features and their interlinking with the other ontologies. To answer this need, in this paper, we address an analysis of the state-of-the-art in legal ontologies (...) and we characterise them along with some distinctive features. This paper aims to guide generic users and law experts in selecting the legal ontology that better fits their needs and in understanding its specificity so that proper extensions to the selected model could be investigated. (shrink)

Ontologies represent the standard way to model the knowledge about specific domains. This holds also for the legal domain where several ontologies have been put forward to model specific kinds of legal knowledge. Both for standard users and for law scholars, it is often difficult to have an overall view on the existing alternatives, their main features and their interlinking with the other ontologies. To answer this need, in this paper, we address an analysis of the state-of-the-art in legal ontologies (...) and we characterise them along with some distinctive features. This paper aims to guide generic users and law experts in selecting the legal ontology that better fits their needs and in understanding its specificity so that proper extensions to the selected model could be investigated. (shrink)

The paper addresses the problem of imaginative resistance in science, that is, why and under what circumstances imagination sometimes resists certain scenarios. In the first part, the paper presents and discusses two accounts concerning the problem and relevant for the main thesis of this study. The first position is that of Gendler, The Architecture of the Imagination: New essays on pretence, possibility and fiction, Oxford University Press, New York, 2006a), The routledge companion to philosophy of literature, Routledge, New York, 2016), (...) according to which imaginative resistance mainly concerns evaluative scenarios, presenting deviant moral attitudes. The second account examined is that of Kim et al. Advances in experimental philosophy of aesthetics, Bloomsbury, London, 2018), who insisted on the link between imaginative resistance on the one hand and counterfactual and counterdescriptive scenarios on the other. In the light of both theories, this paper discusses the importance of addressing the problem of imaginative resistance in the scientific enterprise in the light of some mechanisms of embodied simulation, based on the activity of mirror neurons and investigated within the framework of the Embodied Simulation Theory. (shrink)

Bortolotti argues that we cannot distinguish delusions from other irrational beliefs in virtue of their epistemic features alone. Although her arguments are convincing, her analysis leaves an important question unanswered: What makes delusions pathological? In this paper I set out to answer this question by arguing that the pathological character of delusions arises from an executive dysfunction in a subject’s ability to detect relevance in the environment. I further suggest that this dysfunction derives from an underlying emotional imbalance—one that leads (...) delusional subjects to regard some contextual elements as deeply puzzling or highly significant. (shrink)

(2014). Transition to Crisis-Free Development: A Myth or Reality? World Futures: Vol. 70, No. 2, pp. 93-119.